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INTRODUCTION

The question of whether insurance companies should be allowed
to use gender as a basis for calculating premiums and payments has
received considerable attention in recent years. The United States
Supreme Court has declared in two cases that title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employers or employer-sponsored
pension plans from using gender to calculate pension contributions
and payments. 2 Congress has considered proposals to enact legislation that would prohibit gender discrimination in the writing and
selling of insurance policies. 3 The National Organization of Women
has announced its intention to bring lawsuits challenging the legality of gender-based insurance rating.4 The Supreme Court cases, 5
the lower court cases that preceded them, 6 the pending federal leg1. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
... 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
2. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3492 (1983) (employers may not retain retirement benefit
companies that require equal contributions from men and women but pay lower benefits to
women); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978)
(employers may not require female employees to contribute more money than male employees to pension fund).
3. S. 372, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S795 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983) (Fair
Insurance Practices Act) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in writing or selling of insurance contracts); H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REC. H42 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1983) (Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act) (prohibiting insurers from discriminating on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
connection with application or terms of insurance contracts).
4. See Denver Post, Aug. 16, 1984, at 15A, col. I (reporting announcement by National
Organization of Women (NOW)). In its press release, NOW stated its intention to file a $2
million anti-discrimination suit challenging Mutual of Omaha's practice of charging women
higher rates than men for individual health and disability insurance. Id. Judy Goldsmith,
president of NOW, remarked that the suit will be the first in a series of lawsuits intended to
prevent insurers from charging women more than they charge men for the same product. Id.
5. See supra note 2 (citing cases prohibiting discrimination against women in retirement
programs).
6. See Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1189-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing
claims that employer engaged in pay discrimination by withholding more money for pension
plan from salaries of female employees); Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans, 486 F. Supp. 645, 649-52 (D. Ariz. 1980)
(holding unlawful voluntary deferred compensation plan requiring equal contribution but
paying unequal benefits to men and women), afl'd, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), af'd in part,
reu'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983); Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343, 1345-51
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (employer's lower retirement annuity payments to women than to similarly
situated men violated title VII), rev'd, 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103
S. Ct. 3566 (1983); Spirit v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding unlawful use by employee benefit plans of gender-based mortality
tables to determine benefits), afd in part, rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983), reinstated with modification, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984).
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islation, 7 and the increased public consciousness about equal rights
generally have prompted considerable commentary, both scholarly8
and popular,9 on gender-based insurance rating.
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For further discussion of proposed legislation that would ban gender-based discrimination in insurance rating, see infra notes 50-56 and
accompanying text.
8. In City of Los Angeles Dep't of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that employers could not use sexually segregated actuarial tables to determine employee contributions to employer-provided pension plans without violating title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 717. This decision sparked debate among commentators,
who evaluated the underlying premises for the Court's conclusion that title VII precludes
differential treatment of individuals of a class even though they might actually represent different classes of risk.
The debate began when one group of commentators defended the decision in Manhart by
arguing that individuals are not treated differently as the Act requires because sexually distinct mortality tables in use cause men and women to bear unequal costs. Brilmayer, Hekeler,
Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discriminationin Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and DemographicAnalysis, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 505, 506 (1980). Another commentator attacked this premise as unsound, primarily because it fails to recognize that actuarial tables are efficient
predictors of the actual cost of providing risk-based benefits, and, therefore, this form of discrimination ultimately leads to an equal effect for all individuals. Benston, The Economics of
Gender Discriminationin Employee Finge Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHi. L. REv. 489, 496501, 505-07 (1982). The supporters of Manhart contend, however, that the gender distinction
in mortality tables nevertheless is spurious. Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra, at
531-33. Although sex itself is an immutable characteristic, the mortality tables are highly
unstable predictors because statistical life expectancy reflects a combination of shifting biological, environmental, and behaviorial factors. Id. at 551-59. There is demographic evidence
that shows, for example, that the life expectancy gap between men and women is narrowing.
Id. According to the Afanhart supporters, this implies that factors such as personality and job
stress contribute significantly in determining life expectancy. Brilmayer, Laycock & Sullivan,
The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination:A Reoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. Cii.
L. REV. 222, 236-37 (1983). Professor Benston again responded to the Manhartsupporters by
claiming that if the use of sex-distinct mortality tables results in discrimination against females, such discrimination is either opportunistic or unintentional. Benston, Discriminationand
Economic Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits: A Clarification of Issues and a Response to Professors
Brilmayer, Laycock, and Sullivan, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 250, 265-67 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Benston, Discriminationand Economic Efficiency]. Professor Benston explained that if a company
were to doubt the economic efficiency of sex-distinct tables, it would have a great incentive to
use other predictors. Id. at 267. Benston also argued that disregarding gender in the calculation of statistical life expectancies, in addition to shifting the costs between men and women,
might increase the total cost of providing fringe benefits. Id at 274-75.
Other commentators have also evaluated gender-based insurance rating. See Bernstein &
Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions: Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1241 (1978) (arguing that dictum in Manhart may undermine title VII); Freed & Polsby,
Privacy, Efficiency and the Equality of Men and Women: A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in
Employment, 1981 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 583 (discussing effects of gender discrimination in employment); Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:Manhart, 1979 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 83 (examining the problems of gender discrimination in pension plans);
Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-BenefitPlans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199 (1979) (discussing recent
Supreme Court cases and legislative proposals concerning sexual classification in employee
benefit plans); Note, Sex Discriminationand Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REV. 624 (1973)
(examining consequences of use of gender-based mortality tables); Comment, Gender Classification in the InsuranceIndustiy, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1381 (1975) (discussing social implications of
gender-based discrimination in insurance).
9. See Forbes, Nonsense on Unisex, FORBES, June 20, 1983, at 23 (discussing negative
implications of Fair Insurance Practices Act); Gray, The Unisex Debate: What are the Insurance
Companies Afraid Of?, Ms., Apr. 1984, at 104 (discussing Fair Insurance Practices Act); Seligman, Insurance and the Price of Sex, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 1983, at 84-85 (discussing legislative
proposals and attendant confusion regarding gender-based discrimination in insurance);
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This Article contends that gender is an impermissible basis for
calculating insurance premiums and payments. ' 0 Although this Article agrees with the arguments of those who share this view," it offers a different justification for eliminating gender discrimination in
insurance.' 2 Part I of this Article briefly reviews the status of existing restrictions on gender discrimination in insurance. Part II examines the issues involved in gender-based insurance rating from
the perspective of both insurers and advocates of individual equality. Part III presents a new justification for unisex insurance.
This new justification begins with the premise that American society has reached a collective judgment1 3 that discrimination 14 against
individuals on the basis of innate human characteristics' 5 is repugnant. Those who desire to discriminate on the basis of such characteristics must overcome society's collective judgment by presenting
compelling reasons to justify the disparate treatment. 16 Thus, the
Simpson, Washington: The Battle for Equal Insurance, WORKING WOMAN, Sept. 1983, at 94-98
(discussing gender-based discrimination in health, life, automobile, and disability insurance
plans).
10. The proposed Fair Insurance Practices Act, S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. S795 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983), commonly called the "Packwood Bill," would also prohibit
discrimination in the selling of insurance. See infra notes 50-53 (discussing Packwood Bill).
11. See, e.g., Bernstein & Williams, supra note 8, at 1243 (classification of employees by
gender creates disincentive for hiring class whose fringe benefit costs are higher); Brilmayer,
Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 8, at 235 (gender-based mortality tables violate civil rights law
by using gender as explicit criterion).
12. The justification advanced in this Article is not "different" in the sense that it involves the discovery of new evidence or a new line ofargument that justifies unisex insurance.
Rather, this Article organizes existing evidence and analyses to create a new perspective on
the current debate concerning the desirability of gender equality in insurance.
13. This Article refers periodically to society's "collective judgment" or "collective wisdom." For purposes of this Article, these terms refer to the majoritarian or consensus values
articulated or approved in the political process. Rules of law and identifiable customs, for
example, provide evidence of majoritarian or consensus values. This Article does not analyze
how these values emerge in the political process, and it assumes that articulated rules of law
and identifiable customs are majoritarian or consensus values.
14. For purposes of this Article, the term "discrimination" refers to the act of treating
two or more persons differently. WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648
(1967). Invidious motive is not a necessary element of "discrimination," as defined in this
Article. In other settings, an improper motive must accompany unlawful discrimination. See
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 (1982) (neutral law unconstitutional under equal protection clause only if impact traceable to discriminatory purpose); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (evidence of racially discriminatory intent or purpose necessary to prove violation of
equal protection clause).
15. For a discussion of what constitutes an innate human characteristic, see infra note
106 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text (discussing American views regarding
desirability of discrimination).
Our justification also concedes the proposition that calculating insurance premiums and
payments on the bases of race, sex, and age is actuarially sound. An actuarially sound insurance policy is one whose price closely approximates the amount of coverage and risk assumed.
In an actuarially sound policy the price of an insurance product closely resembles its true cost.
See E.K. MAcKAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 176-79 (1982) (discussing econom-
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argument in favor of unisex insurance proceeds by means of a costbenefit analysis of various kinds of discrimination. First, American
society has concluded that the actuarial advantages of racial discrimination do not justify different insurance ratings for blacks and
whites. Society collectively has decided, therefore, that racial equality in insurance is both desirable and affordable. 1 7 Second,
although discrimination against individuals on the basis of age is repugnant, the actuarial consequences of treating persons with different ages equally in most insurance settings are sufficiently serious to
justify age discrimination in insurance. 18 Thus, although age equality in insurance is morally attractive, it is not affordable. Finally, unlike age equality, individual gender equality in insurance is
affordable.' 9 This Article concludes, therefore, that society should
view gender as it now views race: although gender-based calcula20
tions for insurance premiums and payments are actuarially sound,
feasibility alone does not justify treating men and women differently
for insurance purposes.
I.

RESTRICTIONS ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE

A.
1.

Current Restrictions

Federal law

Numerous federal statutes expressly prohibit gender discrimination in a variety of settings. The most far-reaching of these statutes
is title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,21 which prohibits employ22
ers from discriminating in the workplace on the basis of gender.
The Equal Pay Act of 196323 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 197824 supplement title VII's regulation of gender discrimination
ics of insurance rating). For further discussion of economic considerations in insurance, see
infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 125-47 and accompanying text (analyzing costs and benefits of racial
discrimination in insurance rating).
18. For further discussion of age discrimination in insurance, see infra notes 148-85 and
accompanying text.
19. In this Article, the phrase "individual gender equality" describes the equal treatment
of individual persons without regard to their sex. "Individual gender equality" is distinct
from "group gender equality," which only requires that women as a group receive treatment
equal to that accorded men as a group. From an insurer's perspective, current insurance
rating achieves group gender equality. See infra notes 59-63 (discussing debate on gender
discrimination in insurance from insurance perspective).
20. See supra note 16 (discussing actuarial soundness in insurance practices).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
22. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l); see supra note I (quoting title VII).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
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in employment. 25 Other federal statutes expressly prohibit gender
discrimination in credit applications 26 and in some aspects of education. 27 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that women enjoy
equal status with men under certain federal laws that do not contain
explicit prohibitions against gender discrimination. 28 No federal
statute, however, expressly prohibits gender discrimination in insurance, nor is there any federal statute pertaining to insurance that
could be broadly construed to prohibit such discrimination.
In two decisions the Supreme Court has construed title VII of the
Civil Rights Act to prohibit gender discrimination in connection
with employer-provided pension plans. In City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart29 the Court held that title VII
prohibits an employer from requiring women to make larger contributions to pension plans in order to obtain the same monthly pension benefits as men. 30 The Court concluded that title VII's "focus
on the individual is unambiguous," 3' and that the statute prohibits
an' employer from treating some employees less favorably than
others because of their sex. 32 The Court expanded this line of reasoning in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 33 and held that when contributions
are equal, title VII also prohibits an employer from paying lower
monthly pension benefits to female employees than to male
34
employees.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of sex in payment
of wages); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of pregnancy).
26. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 503, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982) (requiring forms
used in providing credit to disregard gender and marital status).
27. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982) (prohibiting educational programs receiving federal
financial assistance from discriminating on basis of sex).
28. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (Social Security Act provisions pertamining to Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, in which gender classifications
bear no substantial relationship to valid statutory goals, cannot withstand scrutiny under due
process clause of fifth amendment); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204-17 (1977) (Social
Security Act provision for differential treatment of widowers and widows constituted invidious
discrimination); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-39 (1975) (Social Security Act
provision granting compensation to widows but not to widowers constituted gender-based
distinction that violated due process clause of fifth amendment); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (holding unconstitutional provisions of Career Compensation Act of
1949 and of Dependents' Medical Care Act of 1956 that accorded differential treatment to
spouses of servicewomen and spouses of servicemen).
29. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
30. Id. at 711. An employer-provided pension plan is both a condition or privilege of
employment and a form of compensation. See id. at 706. Because of these attributes, an employer-provided pension plan is subject to title VII, which makes it an unlawful employment
practice to discriminate against an individual with respect to "compensation, .. conditions,
or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
31. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
32. Id.
33. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
34. Id. at 3499.
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From the holdings of these cases, it follows that title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of gender by providing
insurance plans for their employees that either entitle men and women to different benefits or require each group to contribute a different amount for the same benefits. 35 Nothing in these decisions,
however, prohibits insurance companies from marketing pension
plans or other insurance products that use gender as a factor in calculating premiums or payments.
2.

State law

Few states have statutes that effectively restrict gender discrimination in insurance. Montana, for example, is the only state with a
statute prohibiting the use of gender in establishing insurance premium or payment levels.3 6 Although some states have statutes
prohibiting the use of gender as a factor in setting automobile insurance premiums, 37 none of these states has extended the principle to
other categories of insurance or to pension plans. A few states have
laws prohibiting gender discrimination when insurers decide
whether to renew policies,3 8 but these statutes do not affect the use
of gender in insurance rating. In addition, some states prohibit discrimination in insurance on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin. 39 Although these prohibitions are broad enough to
encompass rating practices, the statutes do not expressly mention
40
gender discrimination.
35. See id. at 3499; City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
711 (1978).
36. See 1983 MoNT. LAWS ch. 531, § 1 (prohibiting discrimination in insurance and retirement plans on the basis of gender or marital status). The legislation will take effect on October 1, 1985. Id § 4; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at 33, col. 1 (discussing women's
groups' opposition to insurance industry's efforts to repeal Montana's unisex insurance law).
37. See, e.g., HAwAI REV. STAT. § 294-33 (1976); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175E, § 4(d)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2027(c) (West 1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(4) (1982).
38. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(7g) (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(1)(F) (III) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(x)(1) (West Supp. 1984); HAwAri REV.
STAT. § 431-643(7)(E) (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.12-085 (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 234A (1979 & Supp. 1984); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 24A (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1977); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500-2027 (West 1983); N.D. CETrr. CODE § 26.1-0403(11) (1981); WAsH. REV. CODE § 49.60.178 (Supp. 1984).
39. See statutes cited infra note 40.
40. See, e.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-384(2) (West 1980) (risk classifications shall not
be based on race, color, creed, or national origin); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (West 1972) (insurers shall not refuse to accept applicants for insurance or refuse to renew policies because
of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry); idL § 10141 (insurance application may not
require identification of applicant's race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-61(10) (West Supp. 1984) (insurer may not deny reimbursement under
insurance policy on account of race, color, or creed); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1031(3) (1979)
(prohibiting unfair discrimination in insurance because of race, color, religion, or national
origin); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4 (West Supp. 1984) (prohibiting discrimination in issuance,
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All states, on the other hand, have statutes prohibiting "unfair insurance practices," 4 ' a category theoretically broad enough to prohibit gender discrimination. 4 2 These statutes, however, generally
are applied only to prohibit discrimination among persons already
classified in the same "group" for the purpose of setting insurance
premiums or payments. 4 3 Thus, they are not conducive to attacks
on the standards by which individuals are classified into these
groups .44
Finally, although the Supreme Court has held that men and women enjoy equal status under state statutes regulating such areas as
the administration of estates, 45 workers' compensation, 4 6 jury
duty, 4 7 the age of majority, 48 and domestic relations, 4 9 the Court
withholding, extension and renewal of insurance policies because of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry).
41. A majority of states have adopted without amendment a model statute formulated by
the All-Industry Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
See MODEL INSURANCE LAwS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1977)
(providing text of model statute). Each state statute provides that discrimination in the setting of insurance rates or benefits among individuals of the same class and individual life
expectancy or risk level constitutes an unfair business practice. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 402404(7) (1981); MASS. ANN. LAw ch. 176D, § 3(7) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-18-206 (1983).
42. If it would be plausible to assume that men and women belong to the same "class,"
and that mortality rates of men and women are not so dissimilar as to be unequal, then these
statutes conceivably could encompass a prohibition against gender discrimination. See Flaherty, The 'Unisex' Policy Uproar, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 28, 1983, at 9, col. 3.
43. The plain language of such statutes seems only to prohibit discrimination among
persons already deemed to fall within the same class. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(7) (1981)
("[A]ny unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life
. . .") (emphasis added). On September 21, 1983, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Executive Committee approved on an interim basis a model regulation providing that an insurer's practice of issuing the same kind of life insurance policy on both a sexdistinct and sex-neutral basis would not violate any applicable unfair insurance practices statute. NAIC Procedurefor PermittingSame Minimum Nonforfeiture Standardsfor Men and Women Insured
Under 1980 CSO and 1980 CET Mortality Tables, 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 416 (1984). An additional difficulty is that a substantial question exists regarding whether a private right of action
is even available under these statutes. See generally Rokes, Legislative Intent Under the State Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Statutes-Are Private Rights of Action Foreclosed?, 2 J. INS. REG. 432
(1984) (discussing states' treatment of rights of private parties under unfair claims settlement
practices acts).
44. See Flaherty, The 'Unisex' Policy Uproar, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 28, 1983, at 9, col. 3 (states
generally accept classification based on gender as valid reflection of gender-based statistical
differences).
45. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (Idaho statute granting men preference
over women when both are equally qualified to administer estate violates equal protection
clause).
46. See Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147-52 (1980) (Missouri workers' compensation laws denying widower benefits on wife's work-related death but granting
widow benefits under similar circumstances violates due process clause).
47. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-70 (1979) (Missouri law exempting women
from jury service upon request violates sixth amendment); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
537 (1975) (Louisiana requirement that women not be selected for jury service without previous written declaration violates sixth amendment).
48. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-17 (1975) (Utah child support statute provid-
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has never ruled on the question of gender equality in the insurance
field. Indeed, because insurance provisions do not involve state action, a Supreme Court decision concerning equality in insurance
rating is unlikely.
B.

Proposed FederalLegislation

Because of the absence of effective federal and state prohibitions
on gender-based discrimination in insurance, U.S. Senators Mark
Hatfield, Ernest Hollings, and Robert Packwood have introduced
the Fair Insurance Practices Act in the 98th Congress. 50 The bill
prohibits discrimination, including gender discrimination, in the
writing and sale of insurance policies. 51 The most controversial aspect of the proposed legislation is that it would prohibit insurance
companies from using gender-based mortality tables, or any other
form of gender-based grouping, in setting insurance premiums and
53
payments. 52 Currently, the Senate bill remains in committee.
In the U.S. House of Representatives, Representative Robert
Dingel introduced a virtually identical bill entitled the Non-Discrimination in Insurance Act. 54 The House Commerce Committee, however, amended the bill to exempt any class of insurance that is not
part of an employee benefit plan.55 As approved by the House coming that females attain majority at age 18 and males at age 21 violates equal protection
clause).
49. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,459-61 (1981) (Louisiana statute giving husband unilateral right to dispose of property jointly owned with wife without her consent violates equal protection clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979) (Alabama statute
requiring husbands but not wives to pay alimony violates equal protection clause).
50. S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S795 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983).
51. See id. at S828-29 (statements of Sen. Hatfield and Sen. Packwood) (purpose of bill to
prohibit discrimination in insurance on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
applicant).
52. Id. at S829 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (noting unfairness and unreliability of gender-based mortality tables).
53. In April and May 1983, the Senate Commerce Committee held a series of hearings
on the proposed bill. See FairInsurance PracticesAct, Hearingson S. 372 before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Hearings on S. 372].
54. H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983).
55. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., AMENDMENT OFFERED BY CONG. TAUZIN 1 (1984) (amending HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 981H
CONG., 2D SEss., SuBsTrrUTE OFFERED BY CONG. DOWDY 7 (1984) as amending H.R. 100, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983)); see Wall St. J., Mar. 29,
1984, at 8, col. I (discussing amendment). The House Commerce Committee amendment
also provides for the establishment of a commission to study the possibility of enacting federal
legislation to regulate gender discrimination with respect to insurance that is not part of an
employee benefit plan. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY CONG. TAUZIN 1-4.

As a result of the committee's action, one conservative commentator announced that his
"pint-sized wife, who drives less than 5,000 miles a year, can put down her shootin' irons. Her
side finally won." Kilpatrick, Unisex Insurance: Deadin the Water, The Indianapolis Star, May 1,
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mittee, the legislation would do no more than codify the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the requirements of title VII.56
II.

THE CURRENT DEBATE ON GENDER-BASED INSURANCE RATING

A. Overview
An insurance policy is a contract under which an insurer assumes
someone's risk in exchange for a fee. 57 The amount of the fee

should equal the present monetary value of the risk of the loss plus
the insurer's administrative costs. 'A one in five risk of losing $100,
for example, has a present monetary value of $20. Because of the
expense involved in determining the precise monetary value of a
particular individual's risk of loss, insurers group similar risks together and charge each individual in the group the same premium.58
Insurers will continue to classify insured persons into distinct
groups as long as the cost of measuring the differentiating factor is
less than the premium reduction the insurer can offer the members
of a differentiated, better-risk group. 59
For the insurer, gender is a useful, low-cost measurement for differentiating between high and low risks. 60 Moreover, an insurer who
fails to use an actuarially sound measurement of risk to calculate
premiums will be competitively disadvantaged. 61 Suppose, for example, that Insurer A offers an automobile insurance policy to
twenty-five-year-old men and women for the same premium. Men
are higher risks than women because men, on the average, have
1984, at 10, col. 2 (discussing amendment's effect of preventing higher premiums for safer
women drivers by providing exemption to H.R. 100 for individually obtained insurance poliies). Declarations that the battle over unisex insurance is over are probably premature. Mrs.
Kilpatrick might temporarily put down her "shootin' irons," but she would be wise not to
discard them.
56. See Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3493 (1983); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes

29-35 and accompanying text.
57. SeeJ. GRIEDER & W. BEADLs, LAw AND

THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT, 3-4 (4th ed.

1979).

58. See id at 4 (insurers are able to assess risks with high degree of certainty by grouping
individuals together and applying science of probability).
59. See Ej. MACKAAY, supra note 16, at 176-79 (1982) (cross-subsidization of risk groups
eliminated when insurers can differentiate on basis of feature that can be assessed economically); Benston, The Economics of Gender Discriminationin Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revis-

ited, supra note 8,at 494-501 (insurers look at group characteristics rather than individual
distinctions because it is less costly and thus ultimately benefits individuals).
60.

See Benston, Discriminationand EconomicEfficiency, supra note 8,at 254 (employers use

gender as a predictive variable to avoid cost of acquiring more specific information).
61. Cf R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 557 (1971) (reliance on competition to produce rates
that are neither exessive nor discriminatory has long been principle underlying insurance rating in United States).
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more accidents than women. 62 Insurer B will recognize that it can
offer the same policy only to women at a lower price. If Insurer B
then offers such a policy, women will switch from Insurer A to Insurer B, leaving Insurer A with a greater proportion of high-risk
men. As a result, the premium Insurer A charges for the insurance
will eventually increase because of the greater proportion of high
risks.
From the "insurance perspective," there is nothing wrong with
the operation of these market forces. Indeed, insurance markets are
able to function efficiently because insurers charge a price closely
related to the insurance product's true cost. 63 Similarly, from the
insurance perspective, there is nothing inequitable about using gender as a factor in insurance rating. Group equality exists so long as
men as a group pay what is necessary to cover the losses experienced by men, and women as a group pay what is necessary to
cover the losses experienced by women. Using gender to calculate
insurance premiums and payments is a discriminatory practice, but
that is the inherent nature of insurance. Viewed from this perspective, inequality occurs only if one group receives less in return for its
payment than another.
Advocates of individual equality in insurance rating reject the argument that the current system achieves group equality and claim
that the rating techniques in use treat women as a group less favorably than men. 64 More importantly, these advocates reject the notion
that group equality is a proper measure of fairness. 6 5 Instead, they
claim that for some purposes the individual is the proper measure of
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 79
(104th ed. 1984) (table of mortality rates by age, gender, and selected causes).
63. See R. KEETON, supra note 60, at 558 (insurers' pricing below cost might cause some
insurance companies to become insolvent; extreme caution in pricing might create excessive

prices for consumers); see also id. at 566 (as insurers undertake more accurate risk measurement, expense of such measurement causes undesirable increased costs for consumers). For a
discussion of the implications of inefficient insurance markets, see infra notes 184 & 213-23
and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., 1983 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 53, at 33-35 (statement of Dr. Mary Gray,
National President, Women's Equity Action League). Dr. Gray notes that the difference in
mortality rates of men and women does not remain constant over time. Id. at 34. Dr. Gray
pointed out, for example, that at age 65 there is an 84% overlap in the mortality rates of men
and women. Id. Insurers nonetheless rely on a set difference in mortality rates in setting
premiums for all age groups. Id. at 33. As a result, the system is not fair because women in
age groups in which the mortality rate for men and women is similar nevertheless must continue to pay higher rates or to receive lower benefits for equal payment. Id- at 34; see also id. at
42-43 (statement ofJudy Goldsmith, President, National Organization of Women) (men as a
group qualify for more insurance discounts and for more "preferred" or "select" prices, thus
indicating that the system is unfair even though it achieves group equality).
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equality. 66 Insurers should remain free to classify persons into
groups; they should not, however, group individuals on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin, even if these characteristics
67
have predictive value and can be measured at low cost.
Some who proceed from the insurance perspective argue that
prohibiting the use of gender in classifying risks will have a domino
effect. They contend that if gender becomes a prohibited factor, future legislatures might find discrimination on the basis of age, driving record, or medical history repugnant and prohibit insurers from
using those rating factors as well. 68 If values of individual equality
prohibit insurers from using a broad range of rating criteria, eventually insurers will lose the tools necessary to categorize individuals
into groups for risk-spreading purposes. 69 These advocates of the
insurance perspective argue that the result would be severe market
dislocations that could threaten the viability of the entire industry. 7 0
Individual equality advocates, however, deny the existence of this
threat.

71

B. Application of the Debate to Major Categories of Insurance
1.

Life insurance and annuities

Statistics show that, on the average, women live longer than
men. 72 At every age, the incidence of death is higher for males than
for females. 73 Given these statistics, the insurance industry contends that gender-based premiums and payments for life insurance
and annuities are equitable because they reflect the anticipated dif66. See id at 31 (statement of Dr. Mary Gray, National President, Women's Equity Action
League) ("treating all women as the average woman is the essence of discrimination.").
67. See Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, Hearings on H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 549-50 (1983) (statement of Douglas Laycock, Ass'n of University
Professors) (need to predict future losses is not unique to insurance industry and should not
exempt it from civil rights law and policy).
68. 1983 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 53, at 311 (statement of George K. Bernstein,
American Ins. Ass'n).
69. See id at 244-45 (statement ofJames E. Bollin, President, National Ass'n of Life Insurance Companies). Bollin contends that gender, like age, is a critical factor in assessing
risks for which no adequate substitute exists. Id. If gender is eliminated as an acceptable
factor in calculating risks, insurers will be unable to categorize individuals accurately for riskspreading purposes. Id
70. See id. at 246-47. A unisex rating requirement would have its most serious effect on
small insurance companies because they do not have sufficient assets to offset losses caused by
inaccurate risk assessments. Id. Inability to assess risks adequately could strain the resources
of these companies and could lead to insolvency for many. Id. at 246-47.
71. See, e.g., id at 33 (statement of Dr. Mary Gray, National President, Women's Equity
Action League) (many insurers have adopted unisex rating without economic dislocation).
72. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 73
(104th ed. 1984) (1982 preliminary data on life expectancy).
73. Id. at 74.
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ferences in life expectancy of men and women. 74 Because of the
difference in group mortality rates, women either pay less for life
insurance than men pay, or contribute equally but receive greater
benefits than men receive. Conversely, men either pay less for annuities than women, or contribute equally but receive greater benefits
75
than women.
Because gender aids in predicting the longevity of the average applicant for life insurance and annuities, and because gender is a factor that insurers can measure easily and inexpensively, it is
actuarially sound to use gender as a factor in classifying life insurance and annuity risks. 76 Insurers argue, therefore, that forbidding
them to use gender in setting rates and benefits would increase insurance costs for all life insurance customers by causing insurers to
depend on other less cost-effective predictive factors. 7 7 Furthermore, the elimination of gender as a factor in the computation of
life insurance premiums would result in men paying less for cover74. See, e.g., Fair Insurance PracticesAct: Hearings on S. 2204 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Technology, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 136 (1982) (statement of Barbara J.
Lautzenheiser, American Council of Life Insurance) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearingson S.
372].
75. The provisions and benefit options of pension plans vary widely. Consequently,
mandating individual equality will not result necessarily in women, as a class, paying less for
annuities or receiving greater benefits. See Bernstein, The Havoc in Retirement Benefits after Norris, 70 A.B.A. J. 80, 81 (1984) (discussing implications of Norris for individual insurance subscribers). Employers provide approximately 95% of primary retirement coverage through
defined benefit plans. Id. at 81. In these plans, the basic benefit is a single life annuity that is
already paid on a unisex basis. Comptroller General of the United States, Economic Implications
of the FairInsurancePracticesAct (Report to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, et aL) (Apr. 6, 1984), app. I, at
6 [hereinafter cited as GAO Report]. When the annuitant selects a joint-and-survivor option,
however, enabling the surviving spouse to receive monthly benefits should the annuitant die,
insurers frequently use gender-distinct tables to convert the unisex annuity. Id. In these instances, men receive lower monthly benefits than women to compensate for the greater statistical likelihood that a male employee's wife will survive him than that a female employee's
husband will survive her. Id. Under a plan providing for equalized benefits, men will receive
greater overall increases in benefits than women. See id. The Comptroller General has estimated that, assuming no sharing of income between retired employees and their spouses,
women would receive only 26-36% of the benefit increases in annuities under a plan mandating gender equality. Id. Assuming that benefits to married retirees are shared equally with
spouses, however, women would receive about 57% of the benefit increases. Id.
76. A gender-neutral example illustrates the point: an individual deep-sea diver chosen
at random might live longer than an individual college professor chosen at random, but on
the average, deep-sea divers have a shorter life expectancy than college professors because of
their hazardous occupations. See ASSOCIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE MEDICAL DIRECTORS OF
AMERICA AND THE SociEy OF ACTUARIES, MEDICAL RISKS: PATTERNS OF MORTALITY AND SURVIVAL 36, tables § 20 (1976). Insurers can compare accurately and inexpensively these individuals' professions. Deep-sea divers, therefore, should pay more for life insurance than
should college professors. See id. (insurers should allocate cost of insurance to individual who
incurs it). The same is true with gender: an individual female chosen at random might have a
shorter life than an individual male chosen at random, but the average difference in longevity
of males and females validates the use of gender as a factor in calculating premiums and
payments for life insurance and annuities.
77. 1982 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 74, at 137-39 (statement of Barbara J.
Lautzenheiser, American Council of Life Insurance).
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age and women paying more. 78 Women, therefore, would subsidize
life insurance for higher-risk men, and men would subsidize annuities for higher-risk women. From the insurance perspective, such
group inequality would be as inequitable as a life insurance classification scheme in which low-risk college professors subsidize high79
risk deep-sea divers.
Advocates of individual equality in insurance claim that insurers
have failed to achieve equality among groups because they offer better insurance products to men than to women.8 0 These advocates
note that insurers use mortality tables that minimize the expected
longevity differential between men and women to determine life insurance risks, and use mortality tables that maximize the differential
to calculate risks in annuities.8 1 As a result, the price differential
favoring women in life insurance is less than the price differential
favoring men in annuities.8 2 A man, therefore, often pays less for a
life insurance-annuity package than does a woman of the same age
who purchases identical coverage.8 3
Regardless of whether the use of identical mortality tables to calculate risks. in life insurance and annuities would result in group
equality, advocates of individual equality argue that the proper goal
for insurance rating is not group equality, but individual equality.8 4
The average woman may live longer than the average man, but
there is no guarantee that an individual woman will live longer than
78. Cantor, Legislative andJudicialDevelopments in Pension Law, 17 FORUM 166, 182 (1981)
(females' premiums would increase when they no longer reflect cost based on life expectancy)
(citing ACLI Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportationand Tourism of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, May 20, 1981, ACLI GEN. BULL., May 29, 1981, at 3070).
79. The insurers' argument might also be phrased this way: it cannot be discriminatory
to charge the same premium for a life insurance policy or annuity to two people who have
identical life expectancies. A 60-year-old male has roughly the same life expectancy as a 68year-old female; both, on average, will live ten more years. Thus, both should pay the same
amount for a life insurance policy or an annuity. This argument is simply another way of
stating the insurers' basic thesis that the price of insurance products should be a function of
the risk that the insurer assumes. See id. at 182-83 (differentiation of premiums charged on
basis of amount of risk transferred to insurer is not unfairly discriminatory).
80. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing insurance practices that
cause life insurance-annuity packages to be more expensive for women than men).
81. See 1982 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 74, at 75 (statement of Isabelle Katz Pinzler,
Director, Women's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union). Ms. Pinzler notes that
existing mortality tables are biased in favor of men: the life expectancies of men are set back
six-to-nine years for annuity calculations, which justifies larger annual payments for men than
for women. Id. For life insurance calculation, however, male life expectancies are only set
back three years, resulting in male premiums that are more comparable to lower female premiums. Id.; see also Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:Manhart, 1979 Am. B. FOUND. RES.J. 83,
109 (1979) (discussing different methods in use to create mortality tables).
82. See Kimball, supra note 81, at 110.
83. See supra note 81.
84. See Gray, The Case ForNon-discriminationin Insurance, 2J. INs. REG. 3 (1983) (analyzing
effect of group equality concept on individual insurance applicants).
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an individual man. 85 Moreover, the mere achievement of group
equality ignores the fact that the individual who purchases an insurance policy or annuity does not receive treatment equal to that of a
86
similarly situated person of the opposite sex.

2.

Health and disability insurance

Women often pay more than men pay for the same health and
disability insurance coverage.8 7 The cost of maternity coverage is a
major factor underlying the increased cost of health and disability
insurance for women.8 8 From the insurer's perspective, because
only women incur maternity expenses, women as a group should
assume the cost of insuring these expenses. 89
Advocates of individual equality argue that, as a matter of fairness, men should share in the costs of pregnancy and childbirth. 90
Indeed, fairness is not the only justification. These advocates believe
that skewed health insurance rates impose an even higher cost on
society in the form of increased infant mortality resulting from the
inability of women to afford coverage for medical care during pregnancy and childbirth. 9 1 Additionally, they claim that the practice of
charging women more for health and disability insurance encourages employers to discriminate against women in their hiring deci85. Id. at 4. Gray notes that, in a sample including 1,000 men and 1,000 women, the
actual longevity of 84% of the men and women coincided. Id. Only 16% of the sample,
consisting of 8% of the men who died before reaching the average age of male death, and 8%
of the women who died after reaching the average age of female death, possessed statistically
unusual longevity. Id
86. See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 8, at 508 (analyzing discriminatory impact of gender-integrated and gender-segregated mortality tables on individuals and
groups).
87. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at D1, col. 3 (at age 22, women typically pay annual
premium of $300 for major medical coverage, and men of same age pay $230); see also 1982
Hearingson S. 372, supra note 74, at 75 (statement ofIsabelle Katz Pinzler, Director, Women's
Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union) (disability insurance, which became generally
available to women only recently, remains routinely unavailable to homemakers).
88. See 1982 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 74, at 51-52 (statement ofJudy Schub, Director of Legislation and Program Development, National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs) (even when maternity coverage is available, benefit plans often cover
only 38-44%7 of actual costs).
89. See id. at 169-70 (statement of S. Roy Woodall, Executive Vice President, National
Ass'n of Life Insurance Companies) (risk classification insures fair allocation of cost); id at
167 (statement of National Ass'n of Independent Insurers) (eliminating sex differential would
result in unfair subsidies between groups with different risks).
90. See id. at 51 (statement of Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Director, Women's Rights Project,
American Civil Liberties Union) (without equality in insurance, women unfairly receive maternity coverage that is limited in scope or no coverage at all); see also id. at 54 (statement of Dr.
Quincalee Brown, Executive Director, American Ass'n of University Women) (disability insurance often covers payments for vasectomies and prostate operations, expenses that only men
incur but that both men and women subsidize through insurance premiums).
91. See id at 56 (statement of Dr. Quincalee Brown, Executive Director, American Ass'n
of University Women) (over one half of health policies include maternity coverage).
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sions, or to make up the cost by reducing benefits provided to their
employees generally.92
3. Auto insurance

Young women generally pay less than young men pay for auto
insurance.9 3 The industry claims that if insurers were not able to
use gender to calculate premiums, women would have to pay an additional seven hundred million dollars each year for auto insur95
ance,94 even though women cause fewer losses than men.
Insurers point to several compelling statistics. First, men have significantly more automobile accidents than women.9 6 Second, the
margin increases when men under age twenty-five are compared to
women under age twenty-five.9 7 Third, the average man commits
more traffic violations and incurs more major traffic convictions
than the average woman.9 8 Finally, statistics show that men are in-

volved in more than twice as many fatal automobile accidents as women.99 Insurers argue that, because the average male is a higher
risk than the average female, it is fairer to make men pay higher
92. Id. at 49 (statement of Judy Schub, Director of Legislation and Program Development, National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs).
93. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at DI, col. 3 (average annual premium in 1982 for basic
insurance coverage of 23-year-old driver of 1980 Chevy Malibu in Manhattan was $1,017 for a
woman and $1,603 for a man).
94. See The Battle that Needn't Be Fought: The Unisex Dilemma, 60J. AM. INS., 1, 2 (1984)
(unisex rating policy would raise cost of automobile insurance to millions of women by $100
to $600 per year); cf. GAO Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 19 (finding that rate increase would
apply only to single women, and typically only to young single women).
Commentators note that these increased rates would affect most significantly minority women and single women working to support themselves and their dependents. See
Lautzenheiser, Roberts & Walters, H.R. 100/S. 372: Are They Necessary?, 2J. INS. REG. 11, 13
(1983) (analyzing effects of proposed insurance legislation on individuals and groups). According to Department of Labor statistics, in 1978, 40% of the women in the labor force were
single and 58% of the minority women in the labor force were single. See id. (citing UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORKING WOMEN

(1979)).

95. See 1982 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 74, at 98 (statement of George K. Bernstein,
American Ins. Ass'n) (discussing insurance risks associated with men and women).
96. See id. at 98 (statement of George K. Bernstein, American Ins. Ass'n) (quoting CALIFORNIA INS. DEP'T, STUDY OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE (1970)) (men have 143%
more automobile accidents than women).
97. See id. at 99 (statement of George K. Bernstein, American Ins. Ass'n) (quoting Effects
of Exposure to Risk on Driving Record, 1973, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, CALIFORNIA DRIVER FACT BooR 7 (1976)) (males under 25 years of age experience 157% more accidents than females of similar age).
98. Id. (statement of George K. Bernstein, American Ins. Ass'n) (quoting CALIFORNIA
INS. DEP'T, STUDY OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE
STATE, MICHIGAN DRIVER STATISTICS (1980)).

(1970) and

MICHIGAN DEP'T OF

99. Id. at 107 (statement of Sally Kirkpatrick, Gov't Affairs Representative, Alliance of
American Insurers) (quoting Effects of Exposure to Risk on Driving Record, 1973, U.S. Dep't of
Transportation, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CALIFORNIA DRIVER FACT BooK 8
(1976)).
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insurance premiums. 100
Advocates of individual equality do not dispute the statistics.
They claim, however, that insurers can use factors other than gender to measure accurately risk in automobile use. 10 1 Some of these
factors include the length of the applicant's driving experience; the
applicant's annual mileage; the quality of the applicant's driving record; the age, make, model, and safety devices of the applicant's vehicle; the applicant's completion of driver training courses; and the
10 2
territory in which the applicant drives.
In evaluating the effects of unisex automobile insurance policies
in states that have prohibited the use of gender as a rating factor,
commentators sharply diverge in their conclusions. One commentator claims that the markets in those states have been distorted by
unisex rating. 0 3 Other commentators dismiss these claims and report few difficulties arising from the abandonment of gender as a
rating factor.' 0 4 At least one commentator attributes problems that
have arisen in states mandating unisex automobile insurance to fac05
tors other than the use of gender to set premiums.
III. A JUSTIFICATION
A.

FOR UNISEX INSURANCE

The Premise: Equality and the Presumptive Repugnance of
Discrimination

This Article premises its justification for eliminating gender-based
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing increase in cost of auto insurance for women that could result from gender-neutral rating).
101. See 1982 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 74, at 123 (statement of Sanford R. Squires,
Commercial Union Ins. Cos.) (although age, sex, and marital status are statistically valid
predictors of loss experience, these differences can be recognized through use of other, more
socially acceptable variables).
102. Id. at 123-24 (statement of Sanford R. Squires, Commercial Union Ins. Cos.) (listing
factors currently in use at one company).
103. See id at 113 (statement of Sally Kirkpatrick, Gov't Affairs Representative, Alliance of
American Insurers) (price of family insurance always depends on individual family member
with poorest risk).
104. Id at 122 (statement of Sanford R. Squires, Commercial Union Ins. Cos.); see Wallace, Unisex Automobile Rating: The Michigan Experience, 3 J. OF INS. REG. 127, 139 (1984). An
empirical analysis of the effects of unisex rating in automobile insurance in Michigan led Wallace to conclude that
[u]nisex rates for young drivers [the only group affected at all by unisex rating]
caused moderate increases in average premium for young women and moderate decreases in average premium for young men ....
Michigan's experience with unisex
automobile rating, while unique in some respects, is evidence that gender can be
successfully eliminated as a rating factor without the dire consequences that some
have predicted.
Id. at 139.
105. See 1982 Hearingson S. 372, supra note 74, at 127-28. Squires attributes the problems
in the Massachusetts automobile insurance industry to prohibitions on the use of rating factors such as age and marital status, in addition to gender, and to the existence of a "facility," a
large involuntary market for high-risk drivers. Ida
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discrimination in insurance on the proposition that society has made
a collective judgment that discrimination against individuals on the
basis of innate human characteristics 10 6 is repugnant. In addition,
this Article is premised on the assumption that those who desire to
draw distinctions among individuals on the basis of such characteristics must overcome the presumption of repugnance by presenting
compelling reasons for the disparate treatment.
Society's presumption that discrimination is repugnant does not
lead it to treat people equally in all respects.' 0 7 Indeed, our society
admits that each person is unique, 0 8s and it treats people differently
based on some of the identifiable differences among them. 10 9 A theory based on the inherent validity of nondiscrimination is not, however, inconsistent with society's need to draw certain distinctions
among its citizens. Equality is not an absolute or an effective precept to guide conduct;"1 0 instead, it is a conviction that persons
should receive similar treatment to the fullest extent that they are
106. Race, age, and national origin are innate human characteristics because they are unalterable. Gender is also innate; although sex-change operations now exist, they remain extraordinary procedures of questionable viability. It is possible to define intelligence and
physical strength as quasi-innate characteristics, because although humans are born with certain capacities for these attributes, they are affected by environment and the initiative of the
individual may alter these attributes. Religious preference is not innate, because it is subject
to alteration at the will of the individual. American society, however, has chosen to afford
heightened protection to an individual's freedom of religion. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I
("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ..
").
107. See infra notes 125-26 & 148-55 and accompanying text (discussing some situations in
which society has chosen to treat individuals unequally). One commentator labels the principle "treat everyone alike, regardless of individual characteristics" as "radical egalitarianism."
See J. ENGUSH, SEx EQUALrrY 1-2 (1977) (introduction to collection of essays on equality of
men and women). Such an extreme approach to equality is not desirable because it would
require all to share equally, regardless of productivity or need. Id. at 1-3. Unacceptable consequences from equal treatment would include, for example, giving all students the same
grade regardless of performance, or hiring brain surgeons regardless of skill. Id. at 1.
108. Presuming that people are alike and entitled to equal treatment does not presuppose
that all individuals are identical. Each person is a combination of qualities and characteristics
not found in the same proportions in any other person. Individuals can be (and are) grouped
into categories within which they share certain attributes, even though they are dissimilar with
respect to other attributes.
109. See infra notes 125-26 & 148-55 and accompanying text (discussing some situations in
which society has chosen to treat individuals unequally).
110. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 155 (1961) ("though 'Treat like cases alike
and different cases differently' is a central element in the idea ofjustice, it is by itself incomplete and, until supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct"). Professor
Westen asserts that the concept of equality has no substantive content at all absent a supplementary moral standard: "without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a formula
that can have nothing to say about how we should act. Without such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a formula that can do nothing but repeat what we already know." Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982). Other commentators have not
accepted Westen's contention that equality has no normative content of its own. See Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1175-78 (1983) (discussing
normative force in theory ofequality); Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 247-49
(1983) (once we recognize that substantive rules are necessary to measure equality, concept
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alike.I' I
itself no longer necessary). But see Westen, To Lure the Tarantulafrom its Hole: A Response, 83
CoLuM. L. REv. 1186, 1199-1204 (1983) (rhetoric of equality obscures political content).
I 11. Operationalizing equality requires choosing a standard to be "used in determining
when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or different" and, therefore, subject to being
treated alike (equally) or differently (unequally). Hart, supra note 110, at 156. In western
civilization the analysis begins with the presumption, which dates to ancient times, that human
beings are prima facie alike in all essential ways and are entitled to be treated alike. According
to Aristotle, the concept of equality embraces the idea that "things that are alike should be
treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their
unalikeness." ARISTOTLE, THE THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, E.6.1131a-1131b (M. Ostwald,
trans. 1962); see also Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra note 110, at 542-43 (discussing
Greek origins of equality principle). The ancient Hebrews believed that all persons were equal
under the law. See R. Palmer, Equality, in II DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 138, 140 (P.
Wiener, ed. 1973) (Hebrews saw both males and females as created in the image of God); cf.
Leviticus 24:22 (KingJames) ("ye shall have one law for the stranger and citizen alike; for I the
Lord am your God"). The Hebrews also stressed that equality derived from the divinity that
God placed in all people, and from humanity's common descent from Adam. See F. WILtiorr,
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY IN FREEDOM

11-12 (1979) (surveying theories of equality).

The presumption ultimately became the cornerstone for the political theory of government
by consent. John Locke's writing presupposed the validity of the concept of equality: "Men
being. . . by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and
subjected to the political power of another without his own consent." J. LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 95 (J. Gough, ed. 1976). Locke's argument that there is equality
among individuals was influenced by and to a significant extent followed the work of Thomas
Hobbes. See F. WILHorr, supra, at 20-21 (noting that both Locke and Hobbes argued that
there was undoubtedly human equality in the state of nature). See generally T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (London 1651); T. HOBBES, DE CIVE (Amsterdam 1647) (Hobbes' philosophical works
on equality).
The concept of equality found a strong foothold within the American system of government. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (referring to right of persons to equal protection
of laws); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1982) (granting all persons equal right of access to public
accommodations without discrimination); A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863)
("[D]edicated to the proposition that all men are created equal").
If equality is defined as a belief or conviction that persons are alike and should receive
similar treatment to the fullest extent they are alike, then equality can coexist easily with the
recognition that human beings differ from each other. Indeed, Jefferson's recognition of the
"self-evident" concept that all men are created equal, see The Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776), leaves open the possibility that not all men remain equal. The equality that
Jefferson and Locke embraced, therefore, was an equality of opportunity and human will, not
an equality that guarantees a right in all humans to equal treatment for all purposes. This
definition of equality is evident in Locke's writing on the subject of equality of the sexes.
Locke explained that the family existed prior to civil society and is formed by a mutual agreement between a man and a woman. See J. LOCKE, supra, at 82. Each party to the agreement
thereby acquires equal rights and obligations. Id. The wife is an equal partner entitled to own
property and to participate in family decisions. Yet when husband and wife disagree and one
person's will must prevail, "the last determination-i.e., the rule-. . . naturally falls to the
man's share, as the abler and the stronger." Id. For Locke, then, equality did not require
ignoring the unique qualities of individual persons. Clarifying his definition of equality, he
wrote:
Though I have said above . . . that all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality. Age or virtue may give men a just precedence. Excellence of parts and merit may place others above the common level.
Birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to
those whom nature, gratitude, or other respects may have made it due. And yet all
this consists with the equality which all men are in, in respect ofjurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I there spoke of as proper to the
business in hand, being that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom,
without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
Id at 28.
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A policy favoring nondiscrimination ensures that the categorization of individuals that does occur emanates not only from evidence
of dissimilarity, but also from compelling reasons for focusing on
the dissimilarity rather than on existing similarities.' 12 Society in its
collective wisdom might decide, for example, that not all people
should vote in public elections. 1 13 By recognizing a distinction
among individuals based on age, and by finding the relevance of the
distinction to the voting process more compelling than the need to
afford similar treatment based on the similarities of the individuals
14
involved, society can distribute the franchise."
How, then, does society choose which distinctions among individuals are irrelevant or repugnant and which are worthy of recognition? Society's collective sense of whether a particular
categorization is fair or repugnant largely depends on the purpose
of the categorization and on the social atmosphere in which the issue is considered. 1 5 Although Americans view age as a reasonable
proxy for maturity"1 6 and thus find it relevant to whether a person
should be allowed to vote, 1 17 they currently view race as utterly irrelevant to the voting process. 1 8 Modern society is now embarrassed to acknowledge its not-so-recent practice of distributing the
franchise according to a person's race, but what is now repugnant
was once considered fair and just. 1 9 As society matured, it gradu112. The choice to embrace a policy favoring nondiscrimination is not inevitable. Some
political systems have opted for alternative presumptions. See Davis, Cason & Hovey, Economic
Disengagement and South Africa: The Effectiveness and Feasibilityof Implementing Sanctions and Divestment, 15 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 529, 536 (1983) (discussing the Republic of South Africa's policy favoring discrimination against and disfranchisement of blacks).
113. Our society has determined, for example, that individuals under a certain age are not
eligible to vote. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2305, 25-2306, 25-2508 (1981) (requiring
statement at registration that individual will be 18 before next general election); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 2811 (Purdon 1984) (persons under age 18 are incapable of voting). The
United States Constitution, however, guarantees the right to vote to citizens above the age of
18. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of age.")..
114. See supra note 113 (discussing distribution of voting franchise in United States).
115. Thomas Jefferson believed in the concept of equality, see supra note 111 (discussing
Jefferson's views on equality), but apparently found the presumption of equality rebutted for
reasons that modem American society rejects. ForJefferson, racial differences afforded a relevant and compelling reason to distinguish among individuals for purposes of treatment. See
V. DABNEY, THEJEFFERSON SCANDALS: A REBUTTAL 111 (1981) (discussing implications ofJefferson's ownership of more than 200 slaves); cf Hart, supra note 110, at 158 (discussing conflict between concept of slavery and concept of equality).
116. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (framers of U.S. Constitution believed that
maturity accompanied age).
117. See supra note 113 (discussing relevance of age to right to vote in United States).
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (right to vote not contingent on race); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1982) (right to vote may not be abridged on account of
race).

119.

See A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHurro 157 (rev. ed. 1970) (dis-
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ally reached a consensus that the use of race to determine an indi120
vidual's entitlement to vote is unjust and indefensible.
We presume, then, that humans are all alike in sharing the qualities of freedom, equality, and independence. 21 Those who wish to
select certain individuals to receive treatment different from that accorded the rest of society must show that the purpose of the disparate treatment is morally sound1 22 and that the characteristic on
which the disparate treatment is based is relevant to the approved
purpose.' 23 If society cannot afford the costs of equal treatment of
individuals under circumstances in which neither the purpose of the
disparate treatment is immoral nor the relevance of the distinguishing characteristic is lacking, those who seek to discriminate will have
carried their burden.' 24
cussing states that amended their constitutions to disenfranchise blacks between 1890 and
1915).
120. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (fourteenth amendment prohibits
states from denying blacks right to vote in primary elections); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)
(prohibits discrimination in voting on basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude);
id. § 1973 (prohibits use of voting qualifications or prerequisites in manner that results in
abridgement of right to vote due to race).
121. See Locke, supra note 111, at 95 (discussing natural state of individuals free from
government intervention).
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing vital role of morality in shaping
function of concept of equality).
123. SeeJ. ENGLISH, supra note 107, at 2 (noting that defining equality as equal treatment
of similarly situated people could cause unjust results when dissimilarity upon which unequal
treatment is based is not relevant to purpose).
124. In some circumstances, an appraisal of the costs and benefits of a classification will
affect the evaluation of the morality of the disparate treatment and the relevance of the distinction to the purpose of the classification. Because any method of measurement of the costs
of equality will depend in part on the measurer's motive in urging or defending a particular
classification, this cost-benefit analysis is inevitable. See A. OKUN, EOUALrry AND EFFICIENCY:
THE BIG TRADEOFF 88 (1975) (social decisions permitting economic inequality are justifiable
when they promote economic efficiency). Mr. Okun illustrates his proposition with "the
leaky-bucket experiment": suppose that government decides to impose an additional tax on
families earning $50,000 and above, and to transfer the revenues from the tax to families
earning $10,000 or less. Suppose also that there are four times as many low-income families
as high-income families. Some of the transfer will "leak out" on its way to the aid of the poor.
These leakages will take the form of administrative costs and other costs more difficult to
quantify, such as work disincentives, adverse effects on saving and investment patterns, and
changes in socioeconomic attitudes. Id. at 91-96. How much leakage will society tolerate
before opposing the added tax and the income supplement?
Mr. Okun would eagerly make the income transfer if the leakage were in the 10-157 range,
but not if the leakage were 99%. Id at 91-95. Another commentator on equality, however,
probably would make the transfer so long as the leakage was not total. Id at 92 (quotingJ.
RAWNLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 62 (1971)) ("all social values. . . are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any . . . is to everyone's advantage"). Unlike Rawls, who
gives high value to equality at the expense of efficiency, Milton Friedman gives high priority to
efficiency at the expense of equality, and presumably would not make the transfer if leakage
exceeded a relatively low percentage. Id. at 92 (citing M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
161-66 (1962)).
Society collectively decides to balance economic equality and efficiency somewhere on the
continuum bounded by Rawls and Friedman. When society decides that it can no longer
justify the transfer envisioned in the "leaky bucket experiment" because the leakage is exces-
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Under this framework, our society currently tolerates many kinds
of disparate treatment of individuals. Wealthy individuals, for example, pay taxes at higher rates than poor individuals. 12 5 Poor individuals are entitled to receive income supplements from the
government, but wealthy people are not.1 26 Those who demonstrate an aptitude for the practice of law are permitted to enroll in
law schools, while those who are unable to demonstrate such an aptitude are not. In each of these instances, society has decided collectively-either through the legislative process or by custom-that all
individuals should not receive equal treatment. To satisfy our notions of equality, it is sufficient that for certain purposes similarly
situated individuals receive similar treatment. In concluding that
those wishing to discriminate have presented an adequate justification for the disparate treatment, society decides which differences
are irrelevant and which are to be acknowledged and used in organizing society.
B.
1.

PastApplications of the Premise

Racial discrimination

The fairness of eliminating all vestiges of racial discrimination is a
widely shared value in our society. In the last forty years, American
society has taken significant steps toward eradicating the persistent
barriers to racial equality.' 2 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution 128 to prohibit a
broad range of government practices that discriminate on the basis
of race.1 29 In addition, legislation supplements constitutional guarsive, society decides that the costs associated with achieving economic equality are too high,
and that allowing economic inequality to persist at a certain level is justifiable.
The proposition advanced in this Article represents an expansion of the argument that
Okun makes in the economic equality/efficiency debate. Society presumes that distinctions
among individuals based on innate human characteristics are repugnant. Achieving equality,
however, involves some costs-"leakage"-both in economic terms and in terms of effects
less easily quantifiable, such as adverse effects on social stability and disincentives to productive activities. At a certain point, society may decide that the costs are sufficiently great to
justify dissimilar treatment of individuals with regard to the distinction under consideration.
125. See I.R.C. § 1 (1982) (federal income tax rates); id.§ 2001 (federal wealth transfer tax
rates).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1982) (authorizing payment of grants to states for expenditures
for needy families with children).
127. This process began in 1944 when the Supreme Court declared all racial classifications to be suspect. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In 1954 the Court
assumed the vanguard role in promoting racial equality by finding racial segregation in
schools unconstitutional. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) ("separate
but equal" is inherently unequal). For further discussion of the Court's efforts to eradicate
racial discrimination, see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery); id. amend. XIV (guaranteeing all citizens full privileges under Constitution); id amend. XV (granting right to vote to all citizens).
129. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968) (thirteenth
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permit racially based disparate treatment of individuals, it is usually
to provide a remedy for racial groups that have been the objects of
34
past, pervasive, and systematic discrimination.1
For many years, insurers routinely charged blacks and whites different rates for life insurance and annuities. 3 5 From a pure actuarial
amendment grants Congress power to identify "badges of slavery" and to pass legislation
necessary to eliminate them); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 406 (1964) (election system
in which race of each candidate is indicated on ballot violates fifteenth amendment); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (state statute excluding blacks from juries violates
equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment). For a historical review of the Court's efforts to remedy racial discrimination, see generally J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSrITUrTIONAL LAW 611-82 (2d ed. 1983).
130. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (unlawful to fail to hire, to limit, to segregate,
or to classify employees on basis of race); idi § 2000e-2(b) (unlawful for employment agency
to fail to refer for employment any person because of race); id § 2000e-2(h) (unlawful to
discriminate in compensation or seniority system because of race).
131. See 20 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (unlawful to impose any qualification or standard that
results in abridgement of franchise on racial grounds).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (unlawful to deny any person federal assistance benefits
on racial grounds).
133. See 20 U.S.C. § 1142 (1982) (unlawful for any institution of higher education receiving federal benefits to undertake racially discriminatory project).
134. Today, courts find repugnant almost all distinctions based on race. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 486 (1977) (underrepresentation of Mexican-American jurors
is unconstitutional); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149 (1965) (requirement that
voters understand every section of Constitution unlawful because it results in discrimination
on bases of race and national origin). Existing examples of tolerable disparate treatment on
racial grounds involve programs aimed at resetting an intolerable social balance. See, e.g.,
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 460 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of federal law
requiring 10 % of federal business assistance funds to be spent on minority-owned business);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (upholding temporary disparate
treatment by private employers attempting to eliminate racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19
(1978) (finding use of race constitutional because race may become a factor in medical school
admissions decisions under some circumstances); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
436 (1971) (holding illegal employment practice operating to exclude blacks but not shown to
be related to job performance). Society presumably would permit the use of race as a factor
in deciding, for example, who is eligible to play the role of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in a
dramatic production about Dr. King's life. Cf U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1984) (ifnecessary for "authenticity or genuineness," as in the case of an actor or an actress, EEOC will
consider gender a bona fide occupational qualification). No unanimity of opinion exists, however, on even this use of racial classification. See University Daily Kansan, Nov. 4, 1983, at 1,
col. 3 (reporting black students' objections to alleged decision of director of university production of musical Hair to cast black students in black roles).
135. See D. McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 393-94 (rev. ed. 1966) (discussing use of racial criteria in insurance rating); Shepherd, Principlesand Problems of Selection and Underwriting, in LIFE
INSURANCE TRENDS AT MID-CENTURY 62-63 (D. McCahan, ed. 1950) (discussing statistical differences in mortality among blacks, Caucasians, and Orientals influencing underwriting).
Around the turn of the century, racial discrimination and the general lack of interest of
many whites in doing business with blacks prompted the creation of new enterprises, such as
banks and insurance companies, that served only blacks. A few of these enterprises continue
to do business today, still predominantly serving blacks. See A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, FROM
PLANTATION TO GHEro 173-76 (rev. ed. 1970) (discussing rise of black insurance companies
and businesses). See generally W. WEARE, BLACK BUSINESS IN THE NEw SOUTH: A SoCI.
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viewpoint, the discrimination was justifiable.' 3 6 Throughout this
century, the average nonwhite person has had a shorter lifespan
than the average white person. 3 7 At most age levels, the incidence
of death among nonwhites has been higher than the incidence of
death among whites.' 3 8 Moreover, race is a relatively easy characteristic to measure. Viewed solely from the economic perspective of
the insurer, a black person is a better risk in an annuity contract than
a similarly situated white person, and a white person is a better risk
on a life insurance contract than a similarly situated black person.
Notwithstanding the actuarial soundness of using race in setting
insurance rates and premiums, by the mid-1960's insurers had converted to race-neutral actuarial tables.' 3 9 No major economic dislocations occurred in insurance markets following the introduction of
race-neutral rating practices.' 40 The conversion to race-neutral tables apparently was not retroactive; there is no evidence that insurTORY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (1973) (tracing

60-year his-

tory of black-owned insurance company).
136. See R. MEHR & R. OSLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 449-50 n.8 (3d ed. 1961) (social

discrimination involved in setting different premium rate for one race which shows higher
average mortality than second race is no greater than that involved in setting different rate for
any other statistical reason).
137. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 72, at 73. Preliminary
data for 1982 showed that nonwhite males had a life expectancy of 66.5 years (compared to
71.4 years for white males), and that nonwhite females had a life expectancy of 75.2 years
(compared to 78.7 years for white females). Id.
138. See id. at 74 (comparing incidence of death at various age levels among whites and
nonwhites). But see infra note 145 (discussing commentators' arguments that no causal connection exists between race and mortality).
139. Information regarding this transformation is sparse. A 1961 insurance text reported
"a definite trend toward the elimination of special discriminatory treatment of certain races."
R. MEHR & R. OSLER, supra note 136, at 471. The authors of the text attributed this change in
part to state laws forbidding rate differences based on race. Id. at 471 n.8. A 1966 text,
however, reported that insurers continued to use race-based tables in life insurance rating. D.
McGILL, supra note 135, at 393-94. The change probably occurred when insurers realized
that the torrent of federal legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in various aspects of
society could reach insurance practices if the industry did not take steps to eliminate such
discrimination. Historically, many state and industrial self-corrective measures have occurred
when federal intervention has appeared imminent. See R. KEETON, supra note 60, at 537-42
(1971) (discussing allocation of regulatory responsibility between state and federal systems).
Some authority exists to support the proposition that refusal to enter into an insurance
contract with a person because of that individual's race violates 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982),
which provides that "all citizens of the United States shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to . . . purchase. . . real and personal property." Id.; see Ben

v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (D. Colo. 1974) (allegation of
insurers' conspiracy to cause Navajo Indians to purchase insurance through subsidiary that
charged higher rates rather than through other subsidiary predominantly serving whites may

be brought under statute); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112,
115 (D. Mass. 1972) (plausible that racially motivated refusal to enter into insurance contract
with black violates statute).
140. In 1950 American life insurance companies collected $8,189,000,000 in total premium receipts. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1984 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 55
(1984). In 1955 the total of premiums rose to $12,546,000,000, in 1960 to $17,365,000,000,
and by 1970 to over $36 billion. Id.
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ers restructured existing individual contracts in which racial criteria

had been used to calculate premiums and benefits.
Although discrimination against blacks in the selling of life insurance may have increased in connection with the introduction of
race-neutral tables,' 4 1 there is no evidence showing that racial discrimination in insurance markets is more widespread than discrimination in other areas of society. Although covert racially
discriminatory insurance practices probably persist, 4 2 it is significant that society finds intolerable the overt practice of using race as
a factor in calculating insurance premiums and benefits.' 43 Insurers
could measure race at very little expense and thus could make their
products more attractive by pricing the product closer to its true
cost. Less expensive annuities could be sold to blacks and higherbenefit life insurance could be sold to whites if race-based actuarial
tables were used. 144 Nevertheless, insurers have been unwilling to
use race to calculate insurance rates and premiums because society
collectively considers such a practice repugnant.' 45 Because insur141. Insurers can circumvent race-neutral rating tables in property and liability insurance
by "red-lining". See Austin, The InsuranceClassification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 530
(1983) (discussing unfair insurance practices). "Redlining" is the practice of excluding certain classes or areas from consideration in the sale of insurance. See Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REv. 1045 n.1
(1975) (defining term); see also Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 13-14 (1980) (examples of redlining include exclusion of certain
zip code areas and exclusion of buildings over 40-years-old). To date, challenges to such
practices on the ground that they are racially discriminatory generally have been unsuccessful.
Austin, supra, at 530; see Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 423-25 (4th Cir. 1984)
(holding that Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982), neither applies to nor prohibits
redlining practice in hazard insurance). But see Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Mid-American
Fire & Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1108-1111 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (redlining violates Fair
Housing Act). The court in Mackey criticized the opinion in Dunn, noting that it could not find
support in the legislative history for the conclusion that the Act applies to hazard insurance.
Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d at 424.
142. See Bias on Claims: CarInsurance Firm Settles with Black Accident Victims, Nat'l L.J.,July 23,
1984, at 8, col. 1 (reporting on settlement of class action against Texas insurance company
charged with racial bias in paying claims); see also Badain, supra note 141, at 3 nn.1 1-14 (criticizing practice of redlining). For a discussion of redlining, see supra note 141.
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing conversion to race-neutral actuarial tables that began in 1960's).
144. In such a scenario, insurers would not experience severe adverse economic effects.
The benefit to a black insurance applicant, in terms of a decreased annuity premium, would
exceed the insurer's cost of measuring the characteristic upon which the decrease would be
based. Similarly, the cost of measuring the characteristic forming the basis for a decreased life
insurance premium for a white applicant would be lower than the actual benefit received by
the applicant.
145. Commentators also argue that race is not a meaningful classification device because,
although there are connections between gender and mortality, there is no clear genetic or
biological causal connection between race and mortality. See Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:
Manhart, 1979 AMt. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 83, 112-13 (1979) (environmental factors influence
racial mortality more than biological factors). cf. Lautzenheiser, Roberts & Walters, supra note
94, at 12-13 (1983) (scientifically proven genetic differences affecting mortality will make finding substitute for gender difficult). Other commentators vigorously dispute the connection

354

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:329

ance markets are less efficient when products are sold at a price not
reflecting their true cost, the elimination of racial discrimination in
insurance entails some costs for society.' 4 6 Having decided that racial equality in insurance is desirable, affordable, and just, society
14 7
willingly pays these costs.
2. Age discrimination
Although society has reached a consensus that racial discrimination is without merit, it has not reached that same consensus with
respect to discrimination based on age. Those wishing to use age as
the basis for treating people differently have overcome society's presumption of equality in a number of instances. 1 48 The federal Constitution, which contains minimum age requirements for eligibility
for public office, 14 9 provides evidence of successful rebuttal of the
presumption; the framers apparently considered it so obvious that
age brings the wisdom and maturity necessary for skilled and effective government that they deliberated little on the age requirements. 15 0 In numerous circumstances, minors do not enjoy the same
between gender and mortality. See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 8, at
536-39 (association between gender and mortality is unstable); Brilmayer, Laycock & Sullivan,
supra note 8, at 235-47 (studies do not support connection between gender and mortality);
1982 Hearingson S. 372, supra note 74, at 28-30 (statement of Douglas Laycock) (sex/mortality
association not genetic, but product of lifestyle). Whether or not race or sex has a causal
relationship to mortality is not a particularly useful inquiry in any event. Race and sex do
correlate with mortality and, therefore, are actuarially valid tools of insurance rating. See H.
Danenberg, R. Eilers, G. Hoffman, C. Kline, J. Melove & H. Snider, RISK AND INSURANCE 38081 (1964) (explaining that ratemaking involves observing the number and extent of losses
among a sample, and that this analysis can occur "even without a detailed knowledge of the
underlying causes of the loss.").
146. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing interaction between market
and insurers' practice of calculating risks in order to price insurance according to true cost).
For a discussion of the implications of inefficient insurance markets, see infra notes 184 & 21323 and accompanying text.
147. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 8, at 588 (although efficiency receives ample attention
from courts, there may be good reasons to subordinate efficiency to equality; the adoption of
a "color-blind norm" in both statutory and constitutional cases represents such a decision).
148. The Supreme Court has determined that no particular age group constitutes a discrete and insular minority requiring special constitutional protection. Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (upholding mandatory state police retirement age); see also Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding
mandatory civil service retirement age), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1978); Manson v. Edwards,
482 F.2d 1076, 1077 (6th Cir. 1973) (court need only find rational basis for statute establishing minimum age requirement for city councilperson).
149. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (25 years of age for eligibility for House of Representatives); id. art. 1, § 3 (30 years of age for eligibility for Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (35 years of age
for eligibility for presidency); see also id. amend. XII (Vice-President must meet same standards
as President). But cf.id. art. III, § 1 (implicitly rejecting concept of retirement age by granting
life tenure to judges).
150. See Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 859, 864-65 (1981) (framers
believed that maturity and veneration accompanied age).
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rights as adults. 1 5 1 Almost every state, for example, has established
an age at which children must commence school. 152 The existence
of compulsory retirement ages reflects society's judgment that, on
the average, older individuals cannot work as efficiently as younger
individuals and that tenure or seniority rights should evaporate at a
particular age. 153 In addition, the existence of minimum age requirements governing eligibility for social security retirement benefits 15 4 and medical benefits 15 5 reflects society's judgment that the
need for certain government benefits is greater among the elderly
than among the young.
In each of these examples, age is used as a proxy to categorize
individuals for certain purposes. Rather than calculating a child's
intellectual and emotional maturity as the basis for deciding whether
the child can enter school, the state establishes a minimum age.
Rather than calculating the time at which a particular adolescent is
ready to assume the responsibilities of an adult, the state establishes
a general age of majority. Employers set compulsory retirement
ages to obviate the necessity of evaluating each individual's productivity. Rather than assessing each citizen's health, the government
establishes minimum age requirements for eligibility for social security and medical subsidies. Just as gender-based mortality data
may not accurately predict the longevity of a particular male or female,' 5 6 age may not accurately represent the maturity of a child,
the responsibility of an adolescent, the productivity of a worker, or
the quality of a person's health. In each of these instances, however,
151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2705 (1975) (declaring minors incompetent to contract); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121 (1981) (prohibiting sale of liquor to minors); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 41-715 (1981) (prohibiting purchase of liquor by minors); MD. [ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES] § 118 (1981) (prohibiting possession of liquor by minors); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231,
§ 85(o) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974) (declaring minors incompetent to contract); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 2811 (Purdon 1984) (deeming persons under age 18 incapable of voting).
152. Minimum state compulsory attendance ages vary between six and eight. Only Massachusetts and Mississippi do not have compulsory age requirements. See W. VALENTE, LAW IN
THE ScHooLs 24-25 (1980).
153. The Supreme Court has sustained compulsory retirement provisions. See Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 (1979) (upholding requirement that certain Foreign Service employees retire at age 60); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1976)
(upholding mandatory state police retirement at age 50). In Murgia the Court noted that
experts concede a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability
to respond to the demands of ajob. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
at 310-11 (accepting testimony establishing relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to respond to demands ofjob); see also Note, The Age Discimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 384 & n.23 (1976) (experts believe that advanced
age brings deterioration in physical ability).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(c) (1982) (age 65).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (1982) (age 65).
156. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between mortality tables and actual longevity).
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society has determined that the cost of making separate calculations
for each individual outweighs the potential unfairness inherent in
157
the use of age as a proxy for other measurements.
A comparison of federal statutes addressing age and racial discrimination provides further evidence of the successful rebuttal of
the presumption of equality with regard to categorization based on
age. Federal law contains many prohibitions against age discrimination, but these restrictions are less comprehensive than existing
prohibitions against racial discrimination. 158 Congress enacted the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,159 for example, to
prevent arbitrary age discrimination in employment.' 6 0 The Act,
however, only applies to individuals between forty and seventy years
of age. 16 ' In addition, the Act specifically exempts insurance
16 2
plans.
Another federal statute, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,' 03
purports to relieve age discrimination in federal assistance programs' 64 and in programs receiving federal financial support. 6 5
This statute, however, expressly authorizes action that "reasonably
takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation
or the achievement of any statutory objective of such program or
activity."' 66 Similarly, federal statutes that prohibit racial, sexual,
religious, and ethnic discrimination in access to public accommodations,' 6 7 to public facilities, 168 and to public education' 6 9 make no
reference to discrimination based on age. Moreover, Congress expressly excluded age discrimination from the prohibitions of title
VII because of fear that its inclusion would disrupt group insurance
70
plans.'
In many instances, therefore, it appears that those who wish to
157. See Neugarten, Age Distinctions and their Social Functions, 57 Cm.-KErrr L. REV. 809, 82223 (1981) (society will tolerate imperfect classifications if reasonable need exists for
classification).
158. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (discussing federal prohibitions

against racial discrimination).
159. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982)).
160. See 29 U.S.C. § 62 1(b) (1982) (purpose of Act).
161. Id § 631(a).
162. See id. § 623(0(2) (authorizing employers to observe terms of bona fide insurance
plan if not evasive of Act's purposes).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982).
164. Id. § 6101.
165. Id. § 6102.
166. Id. § 6103(b)(1)(A).
167. Id. § 2000a(a).
168. Id. § 2000b(a).
169. Id § 2000c(b).
170. See 110 CONG. REC. S13490-92 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
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discriminate on the basis of age have succeeded in rebutting the
presumption of equality. The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 17 1 the principal federal age discrimination statute, covers an
area in which proponents of age discrimination have failed; it provides that the presumption of equality remains applicable to employment decisions affecting individuals between the ages of forty
and seventy.1 7 2 Although it is reasonable to say that the average
sixty-nine-year-old cannot lift as much weight as the average fortyyear-old, the Act prohibits an employer seeking to hire an employee
to lift boxes from choosing the younger applicant rather than the
older one solely because of the age difference. Rather, the employer must look to other factors, such as the amount of weight that
each individual can lift. The employer can justify a decision to hire
the younger applicant if the younger applicant can lift more than the
older individual, assuming strength is a necessary job qualification.' 73 The basis for the hiring decision can be aptitude for the job,
but cannot be age.
Employers could avoid the cost of measuring individual aptitude
if they arbitrarily could restrict eligibility for jobs to those of particular ages. Society, however, has demonstrated its willingness to tolerate the costs associated with eliminating age discrimination in
174
employment for persons between the ages of forty and seventy.
75 preIn other areas, society chooses to tolerate age discrimination'
sumably because equal treatment of persons of all ages would create
economic and social dislocations outweighing1 76whatever justice is
sacrificed in the process of age discrimination.
Insurers often use age as a factor when calculating insurance rates
and premiums. In automobile insurance, for example, young driv77
ers usually pay higher premiums than middle-aged drivers.1
171. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1982).
172. Id. § 631.
173. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969) (although refusal to hire women for jobs requiring lifting of heavy weights is illegal under title VII, employer may require applicants to pass weight-lifting test if business necessity for such
requirement exists, despite potential disparate impact of test on women).
174. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing federal act that prohibits
age discrimination in employment affecting individuals between ages of 40 and 70).
175. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text (discussing legal areas of age
discrimination).
176. Granting 50-year-olds the right to retire and to receive retirement benefits, for example, presumably would induce many able-bodied individuals to leave the work force. The mass
attrition of capable individuals could have a catastrophic effect on American industry.
177. Young drivers are involved in more accidents than older drivers. For example, more
than one-third of all fatal car accidents involve drivers between ages 15 and 24. See Young,
Eager, and Dangerous, 59J. AM. INS., 23, 26 (1983-84) (discussing traffic fatalities among young
male drivers); 1982 Hearings on S. 372, supra note 74, at 98 (statement of George K. Bernstein,
American Ins. Ass'n) (younger drivers experience more accidents than older drivers). See gen-
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Health insurance is typically more expensive for the elderly than for
the young. 178 Because the average incidence of mortality increases
with age,' 79 a younger person typically pays a smaller premium for
life insurance than an older person pays for the same coverage.1 8 0
Society generally tolerates age-based distinctions in insurance because mandating age equality usually would cause intolerable
dislocations.
Even in life insurance, where the relationship between age and
risk is most obvious, it is possible to argue that age is an imperfect
predictor of longevity insofar as the individual is concerned. Individuals do not reflect advancing age in the same ways. 18 1 Because of
individual differences in physical and mental deterioration, the average life expectancy of forty-year-old persons as a group may differ
substantially from the actual longevity of a particular forty-yearold.' 8 2 Society, therefore, could choose to prohibit insurers from
using age as a factor in calculating insurance rates and premiums,
thus forcing them to rely on factors such as an individual's health
experience and susceptibility to accidental injury. Measurement of
these alternative predictive factors, however, would entail increased
83
costs and decreased reliability.'
Although it would be morally attractive to disregard age as a factor in insurance rating, the problems that would accompany such a
practice are so significant that it cannot be seriously argued that age
equality in life insurance is desirable. If a sixty-five-year-old male
and a twenty-five-year-old male could purchase life insurance policies with the same benefits at the same price (an average of the current higher price for elderly males and the lower price for young
eraly Austin, supra note 141, at 538-41 (discussing use of age as factor in calculating auto
insurance ratings).
178.

See S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 429 (10th ed. 1982) (discussing role of

age factor in determination of health insurance premiums); J. Angle & J. McCuistion, Risk
Selection and Substandard Risks, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 334 (3d ed. 1973)
(discussing methods of risk selection and classification).
179. See STATISTMCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 72, at 73 (data on life
expectancy in 1982).
180. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF LIFE INSURANCE 632-37 (7th ed. 1980)
(discussing computation of life insurance ratings).
181. No exact definition of the aging process exists. Because the health of an individual
depends in substantial part on the health of that person's vital organs, and because different
individuals' organs deteriorate at dissimilar rates, it is difficult to achieve a precise correlation
of age, health, and longevity. See Birren & Loucks, Age Related Change and the Individual, 57
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 833, 840-41 (1981) (aging process a product of multiple independent
processes).
182. Id. at 849 ("[t]he diversity and individuality of aging patterns is the essential fact.").
183. See Benston, Discrimination and Economic Effidency, supra note 8, at 257 (market pressures force insurers to use age as rating factor because it is inexpensive to use and more
accurate than other factors).
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males), elderly males as a group would purchase more life insurance
policies, causing the insurers' costs to increase substantially. On the
other hand, because the price of the product would far exceed the
product's worth to a young male, fewer young males would buy life
insurance, and eventually only elderly males would be left buying
insurance at a price equal to that which elderly males paid before
the price to elderly males was reduced. In short, the market for life
insurance would be seriously disrupted.1 8 4 This would be unfortunate because many young males would like to purchase life insurance if its price accurately reflected the cost of covering the risk of a
young male's premature death. Mandating age equality in life insur18 5
ance would inflict too great a burden on society.
C. An Application of the Premise to Gender-Based Discriminationin
Insurance
To summarize the earlier discussion in this Article, society has determined that discrimination against individuals on the basis of innate human characteristics is repugnant, and that those who desire
to discriminate on the basis of such characteristics have the burden
ofjustifying the disparate treatment.1 8 6 Disparate treatment is justifiable when advocates of discrimination can rebut society's presumption of equality by demonstrating that equality is not worth the
associated costs. 18 7 Society has decided that advocates of raciallybased insurance rating have failed to rebut the presumption. 8 8 The
costs associated with abandonment of this actuarially sound rating
184. As long as life insurance remains a voluntary purchase and is not part of a national
life insurance program that the government provides, it is not possible to maintain a life insurance pool without age discrimination. See Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:Manhart, 1979
AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 83, 108 (age discrimination necessary in life insurance pool). Some of
the first life insurance companies were burial societies that paid their members' funeral expenses by distributing the cost of each death among the membership. As younger members
realized that they frequently were contributing to the expenses of deceased members who
rarely were their peers, younger members left the societies and few new members joined. See
Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective:City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 2 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 46 (1979) (discussing failure of early life insurance companies). The gradual attrition of the younger members caused expenses to increase until only
elderly persons were left to make contributions, eventually causing the system to disintegrate.
Id.
185. A few states have refused to extend the rationale justifying age discrimination in life
insurance to encompass age discrimination in automobile insurance. See HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 294-33 (1976) (insurers may not use age as factor in calculating auto insurance rates); MAss.
GEN. I.Aws ANN., ch. 175E, § 4(d) (West 1983) (insurers may not charge different rates for
auto insurance on basis of age); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2027(c) (West 1979) (insurers
may not discriminate on basis of age in setting auto insurance rates).
186. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text (discussing society's consensus regarding discrimination).
187. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text (discussing presumption of equality).
188. For a discussion of the elimination of racially based insurance rating, see supra notes
139-47 and accompanying text.
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factor1 8 9 are insufficient to persuade society to tolerate race discrimination in insurance. A different attitude, however, operates with
respect to age. Society has decided that it cannot tolerate the market dislocations that would occur if insurers could not consider the
factor of age in most insurance rating procedures. 190
The current debate over the use of gender as a factor in insurance
rating' 9 ' demonstrates that society has not yet reached a consensus
on whether the presumption of individual gender equality in insurance has been successfully rebutted. This Article contends both that
the presumption of equality has not been successfully rebutted with
respect to gender discrimination in insurance, and that the costs of
disregarding this actuarially sound rating factor are affordable.
1.

Gender, race, and age discriminationcompared

Gender more closely resembles race than it resembles age.1 92 Individuals are born with a certain sex and race; absent extraordinary
measures, an individual has only one race and one sex per lifetime.
Although at any given moment individuals have different ages and
can be categorized accordingly, age is a trait shared by all, and all
individuals move equally through time.
Just as society has placed a higher value on racial equality than on
age equality, 193 society has placed more emphasis on the need to
achieve gender equality than it has on the need to achieve age equality. Federal statutes commonly prohibit discrimination based on
race, national origin, religion, and gender, while omitting any reference to discrimination based on age.' 94 These statutes presumably
reflect society's judgment that eliminating gender and race discrimination in various settings is desirable and affordable, but that eliminating age discrimination, while perhaps desirable, is not affordable.
Despite the number of statutes prohibiting gender discrimination,
current national policies do not value gender equality as highly as
189. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (mortality statistics among whites and
nonwhites demonstrate actuarial soundness of factor of race).
190. For a discussion of society's tolerance of age discrimination in insurance, see supra
notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (discussing debate between advocates of
individual equality in insurance and advocates of group equality in insurance).
192. See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 8, at 536-39 (Civil Rights Act
prohibits sex and racial discrimination in identical terms in same clause).
193. Compare supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text (discussing society's efforts to
eliminate racial discrimination) with supra notes 148-76 and accompanying text (discussing
society's tolerance of age discrimination in many situations).
194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in employment); 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in wages); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982)
(prohibiting discrimination in credit).
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racial equality. Gender discrimination is easier to justify under an
equal protection analysis than racial discrimination.1 95 The federal
constitutional prohibitions against race discrimination have no
counterpart in the area of gender discrimination, and the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), which would have elevated gender
equality to a right of constitutional stature, recently failed to attain
passage. 19 6 Despite the failure of the ERA to attain the
supramajority enactment requirements, evidence suggests that the
majority viewpoint in this country places a high value on the ideal of
gender equality.' 9 7 Because federal statutes already require gender
equality in many contexts, 198 it is reasonable to assume that the failure of the ERA reflects society's judgment that gender equality in
some areas of our society is not desirable.19 9 Thus, the ERA's nonenactment is not determinative on the question of whether gender
equality in insurance is desirable. Society still presumes that discrimination on the basis of innate human characteristics is repug195. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (invalidating preference for males in Idaho
statutory scheme for selecting administrators of intestate decedents' estates). In Reed the
Court reached its holding without declaring gender to be a suspect classification. Id at 70-77.
Reed requires only that a gender-based classification be reasonable and bear a substantial relationship to a government objective. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412,415 (1920)). In a later case, the Court articulated an intermediate level of review for
the examination of gender-based classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(finding unconstitutional Oklahoma law prohibiting sale of 3.2 beer to males, but not to females under age 21). Under Craig gender-based classifications can withstand constitutional
challenge only if they serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. Id This level of constitutional scrutiny is less searching than
the "suspect classification/compelling-government-interest" test applied to classifications
based upon race. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny); see also Rutherglen, supra note 8, at 204-05 (observing that
cases involving gender and cases involving race receive different constitutional treatment, in

terms of both results and rationale).
196. After Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972, 35 states ratified it.
The Amendment needed the ratification of three more states but failed to obtain such ratification before the June 30, 1982 deadline. Wash. Post, June 25, 1982, at A2, col. 4. Shortly
thereafter, the Amendment was reintroduced in Congress. See Wash. Post, July 15, 1982, at
A5, col. 2 (describing rally by congressional sponsors to introduce new drive for passage). In
November 1983 the Amendment fell six votes short of a two-thirds majority in the House of
Representatives. To protest the Democratic leadership's use of an expedited procedure to
bring the Amendment to a vote without permitting amendments and with only 40 minutes of
debate, 12 of the Amendment's sponsors voted against it. Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1983, at A1,
col. 4.
197. See G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1981 171 (1982) (reporting that
63%o of people polled favor Equal Rights Amendment; 32% are opposed).
198. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing statutory prohibitions
against gender discrimination).
199. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 8, at 589 (arguing that strong efficiency interests or
broadly based social norms requiring different treatment of men and women may justify explicit gender classifications which otherwise are presumptively invalid). Freed and Polsby
note that society collectively has decided to place a greater value on the social norm regarding
intersexual privacy than on the need to abolish gender discrimination. Id. at 597. In contrast,
society has not chosen to value social norms more highly than the need to abolish race discrimination. Id. at 594-95.
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nant. 20 0 The following question, therefore, remains to be answered,
notwithstanding the fact that our society does not yet value gender
equality as highly as racial equality: have those who wish to discriminate on the basis of gender demonstrated that treating individuals
equally in insurance without regard to their gender entails costs that
society cannot reasonably afford? The nature and magnitude of the
costs of prohibiting use of gender-based tables in insurance rating
largely depend on whether the prohibition extends retroactively or
only prospectively.
2. Prospectiveprohibitions on gender-based rating
Apart from furthering the ideal of individual equality, a requirement that insurers employ unisex rating in all prospectively issued
insurance policies would, to some extent, redistribute wealth and
impair market efficiency. 2 0 1 Although both effects entail some costs,
this Article contends that society can afford these costs.
Except where unisex insurance is already in force, 20 2 a requirement of unisex rating in all prospectively issued insurance policies
would redistribute wealth. Men would pay less in the future for automobile and life insurance, and women would pay more. 20 3 Conversely, women would pay less in the future for annuities, health
insurance, and disability insurance, and men would pay more. 20 4
Because health insurance premiums for all persons would reflect the
costs of pregnancy benefits, a net cost would be imposed on those
who do not bear children, whether male or female, to the benefit of
those who do. 20 5 Some of these redistributive effects might be tempered-or perhaps even reversed-if insurers deprived of the use of
the gender factor in insurance rating substitute other rating
206
factors.
200. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text (discussing social and ideological bases of perceptions regarding discrimination).
201. See infra notes 202-23 and accompanying text (discussing consequences of unisex

rating).
202.
Four states have mandated unisex automobile insurance. See supra note 37 (citing
North Carolina, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Michigan statutes). Most auto insurance is already unisex for single drivers over 29 and married drivers over 25. GAO Report, supra note 75,
app. I, at 19. Some annuities have unisex options. See supra note 75 (discussing unisex annuities). Group insurance, which includes about half of the life insurance policies and 87% of the
health insurance policies currently in force, typically is calculated on a unisex basis. See GAO
Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 19.
203. GAO Report, supra note 75, app.I, at 19.
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id. For example, automobile rates may be based on such factors as mileage, safety
record, and make and model of the car. Life, health, and disability rates may derive from the
insured's smoking habits and occupation.Id.
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Except for the administrative costs of converting to unisex rating,
the redistribution of wealth that would accompany such a conversion would not reduce society's resources and thus would not impose a net cost on society.2 0 7 The Comptroller General has
estimated that the administrative costs of converting to unisex rating would be approximately $465 million, 20 8 a sum that can easily
be absorbed within existing rate structures. The figure is somewhat
less than four percent of the insurance industry's normal administrative costs for one year.2 0 9 Society as a whole, therefore, can afford the redistributive effects of individual gender equality in
insurance.
Despite the minimal costs to society collectively, gender equality
in insurance would adversely affect some individuals. Under a gender-based rating system, automobile insurance rates for young men
are higher than the rates for young women. 210 Under a unisex rating
system, rates for young men would decline while rates for young
women would rise. Although this result might enable more lowerincome men to buy insurance, it would make it more difficult for
lower-income women to afford automobile insurance. Similarly, if
individual gender equality in health insurance entailed raising rates
for men and reducing rates for women, some individual women
would benefit, while some individual men would suffer.211 The extent of these individual burdens and benefits would depend on the
extent to which members of each sex and income level buy particu2 12
lar kinds of insurance.
207. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing net cost to society of conversion to unisex insurance).
208. The Comptroller General agreed with the rough estimate of the American Academy
of Actuaries that the costs of both developing new unisex policies and revising existing policies would be approximately $1.3 billion. GAO Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 27. This figure
does not, however, include any estimate for the costs of state insurance departments to approve the new policies or the possibly higher continuing costs of administering the new policies. Id. In any event, about $880 million of the $1.3 billion figure would be spent on revising
existing policies. Id. at 28. If sex equality were mandated only prospectively, administrative
costs would decline to approximately $465 million. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying
text (arguing that unisex rating requirement should not apply retroactively).
209. GAO Report, supra note 75, at 5.
210. See supra note 93 (comparing average annual auto insurance premiums for men and
women in 1983).
211. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (noting that the average woman currently pays more than the average man for health insurance).
212. A single female head-of-household in a lower income bracket, for example, might
find the purchase of health insurance more of a necessity than the purchase of auto insurance.
Under a unisex insurance scheme, the individual might benefit from a reduction in the cost of
health insurance without suffering the burden of increased costs for auto insurance.
If unisex rating does result in men paying more for certain types of insurance and women
paying more for others, it is conceivable that these higher costs would weigh more heavily on
persons in lower income brackets. The possibility that this result might ensue does not justify
abandoning the concept of unisex rating. If in practice the redistributive impact of unisex
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In addition to causing a redistribution of wealth, a prospective requirement of unisex insurance would impair market efficiency to
some extent. 21 3 Insurers charge prices for insurance coverage
based on the amount of risk they assume. 21 4 Gender, an actuarially
sound predictive device, does correlate with risk. 21 5 Insurers currently use gender to calculate premiums and payments because it is
cost-effective to do so. 21 6 If other factors could predict risk as accurately as gender at a lower cost, or more accurately than gender at
the same cost, insurers would use those other devices. 21 7 To the extent gender is cheaper to measure than other factors having equal or
even lower predictive value, 21 8 forcing insurers to rely on these
other factors that are more expensive to measure would cause the
expenses of insurers to increase, which ultimately would be reflected in the prices charged for insurance products.
With insurers using less accurate predictors of loss, rates charged
for insurance would reflect less accurately the true cost of insurance.
This would have two consequences. First, overall consumer satisfaction would decline. When prices reflect the true costs of the insurance product, consumers are induced to purchase the optimal
amount of insurance worthwhile to them. If prices do not reflect
true costs accurately, consumers are induced either to purchase
more insurance than they need (if costs are too low) or too little
insurance (if costs are too high). Distorting demand redirects society's resources to less productive uses and prevents consumer welfare from being maximized. 21 9 Second, the discrepancy between
rating does place lower-income insurance applicants at a disadvantage, then society could
compensate for this effect by retrieving a portion of the benefits received by higher-income
insureds and by redistributing these benefits. Society could accomplish this by means of a
revision of the tax laws, which currently exclude from taxation life insurance benefits and
benefits received from health and accident plans. See I.R.C. §§ 101, 104-105 (1985).
213. See GAO Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 4 (suggesting that gender-neutral insurance
may reduce efficiency of market).
214. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing methods of calculating insurance premiums).
215. See supra notes 59-62 (discussing correlation of gender and risk).
216. See Benston, Discriminationand Economic Efficiency, supra note 8, at 254 (employers use
gender as a predictive variable to avoid cost of acquiring more specific information).
217. See GAO Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 19-24 (discussing current views regarding
predictive value of rating factors).
218. See Benston, Discriminationand Economic Efficiency, supra note 8, at 254 (employers use
gender as a predictive variable to avoid cost of acquiring more specific information).
219. An example from the automobile insurance market illustrates the point. Under
unisex rating, the cost of automobile insurance for men would decline. The availability of
insurance at a price below the true cost of the risk involved would induce men to purchase
more insurance, or to obtain better coverage and lower deductibles, than they would if they
were charged a more accurate price. Simultaneously, the higher cost of auto insurance for
women would discourage purchase of otherwise desirable coverage by women. Overall consumer satisfaction is not maximized, and, therefore, society as a whole is worse off. See GAO
Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 24 (recognizing that purchase of underpriced insurance leads
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price and actual cost also would cause insurance prices in general to
increase. Because insurers would have to rely on less accurate predictive devices, they would need to maintain greater financial
reserves to compensate for the increased uncertainty. 2 20 To increase reserves, insurers would have to increase their revenue by
22 1
raising prices. The operation of the "adverse selection principle"
22 2
would create additional pressure on prices.
It is difficult to predict precisely the impact that unisex rating
would have on market efficiency. The Comptroller General has concluded that the adverse effects of unisex rating on market efficiency
would not be as large as the administrative costs of implementing
gender-neutral insurance. 2 23 If the Comptroller General's estimate
is correct, then society can afford the market impairment that individual gender equality in insurance would entail.
3.

Retroactive prohibitions on gender-based rating

Although the costs associated with prospective individual gender
equality in insurance are affordable, it is less clear that society can
afford the costs of retroactively mandating equality. The Comptroller General has concluded that revising existing insurance policies
to reflect unisex rating would cause serious disruptions, including
insolvencies of some life insurance companies. 2 24 Additionally, conto wasteful spending and that refusal to purchase overpriced insurance leaves consumer demand unsatisfied). In addition, if men as a class purchase more automobile insurance than
women prior to unisex rating, then the excess purchases men would be induced to make after
the imposition of unisex rating would not be offset in total by the reduced purchases women
would make. Society as a whole, then, would purchase too much insurance, spending resources that could have been spent on other necessary goods and services.
220. See id. at 17. Life insurance companies immediately would need to increase their
financial reserves. The laws of most states require life insurers to maintain reserves adequate
to cover the actuarial present value of their liabilities. Id. If unisex rating caused liabilities to
increase, life insurers would have to bolster their reserves immediately or face legal insolvency. Id.
221. The "adverse selection principle" contends that, when insurance companies underprice or overprice their products, consumers modify their insurance requirements. See id. at
25; see also supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing likely effects of unisex rating on
consumer demand for insurance).
222. An example from automobile insurance again illustrates the point. If men are induced to purchase excess insurance because the price of the product is below true cost, the
average risk that insurers undertake increases. When the average risk increases, the insurers'
cost increases. This translates into higher rates for all consumers or, if insurers cannot increase revenues to the necessary levels, fewer insurers in the marketplace. See GAO Report,
supra note 75, app. I, at 25. Adverse selection would operate most dramatically in the health
insurance market. Id. According to one estimate, unisex rating could increase health insurance premiums for young males by 56%. Id. As a result, young men would refrain from
buying health insurance, and insurers would charge higher rates to remaining customers to
regain lost revenues. Jd
223. Id. at 26-27; see also supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing administrative costs of conversion).
224. See GAO Report, supra note 75, app. I, at 34 (views of Comptroller General); see also S.
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sumers who have entered into insurance contracts in reliance on

premium and benefit levels calculated under a gender-based rating
scheme would suffer from their reliance. In view of its potential adverse impact on the viability of existing insurance contracts, retroac2 25
tive unisex rating is not affordable.

Society should decide, therefore, to abolish gender-based distinctions in prospective insurance rating, but to avoid paying the price

of remedying past gender discrimination in insurance. Although
the distinctions made in the past are unfortunate, the costs to society of remedying past discrimination outweigh the obtainable benefits. Society has opted for affirmative action to rectify past racial
injustice, but at least insofar as gender discrimination in insurance is
372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S795 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983); H.R. 100, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983). This legislation would require
the revision of existing pension and insurance contracts to reflect unisex rating either by
equalizing premiums on contracts with equal benefits or by equalizing benefits on contracts
with equal premiums. S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S795 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1983); H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983). An
increase in premium payments during the term of a policy would no doubt prompt policyholder lawsuits, a significant short-term disruption. The GAO, therefore, suggests that most
companies would equalize insurance contracts by increasing benefits or by reducing premiums for the disadvantaged sex. See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 4. Whether companies increase benefits or reduce premiums, the average level of an insurer's liabilities would increase
without corresponding increases in assets. This would create unfunded liabilities for insurers.
I. Because state law requires life insurance companies to carry full reserves to back up the
actuarial present value of their liabilities, id app. I, at 17, failure to increase premiums could
result in insolvencies in the short run. ld. app. I, at 18. See supra note 222 (discussing effects
of unisex insurance rating requirement on life insurers). In the Comptroller's opinion, the
industry can avoid these adverse effects only by applying unisex rating prospectively, and
exempting existing individual insurance contracts from its scope. See GAO Report, supra note
75, app. I, at 18; see also 1982 Hearingson S. 372, supra note 74, at 72 (statement of Edward .
Koch, Mayor of New York City) ("enormous financial costs" of retroactive provisions of S.
372 for city's employee pension program would seriously harm city's financial health).
225. In recent confrontations with this issue, the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
have reached essentially the same conclusion. See Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983) (employer
retirement plans paying lower benefits to female retirees than to male retirees violate title
VII). The district court in Norris had approved a remedy requiring the employer-the State of
Arizona-to make all future annuity payments equal for similarly situated women and men.
See Norris 486 F. Supp. at 652. The Supreme Court found the district court's remedy retroactive because it required the state to fund deficiencies in past contributions of female retirees
to the insurance plan. See Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510 n.10. Concluding that retroactivity would
be catastrophic for the insurer, i at 3510, the Court held that liability should be prospective
only. ldL For further discussion of Norris, see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
In light of Norris, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reconsidered its
decision in Spirt v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1068 (2d Cir. 1982)
(granting retroactive relief to remedy use of gender-distinct mortality tables in university employees' annuity plan), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983). On remand, the Second
Circuit interpreted that Norris proscription against retroactive remedies to be inapplicable in a
case in which retroactivity places no added financial burden on the insurer. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 735 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984). Because the insurer in Spirt did not guarantee a minimum level of benefits to retirees, and
therefore could decrease benefits to male retirees to compensate for increased benefits to
females without incurring liability, the court reaffirmed its retroactive remedy. Id
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concerned, the balancing of costs and benefits merits a different response to past sexual injustice.
CONCLUSION

Few ideals are more fundamental to the American collective consciousness than the proposition that all persons should receive
equal treatment to the extent they are alike. Pursuant to this ideal,
American society presumes discrimination on the basis of innate
characteristics to be repugnant and places on those wishing to discriminate the burden of justifying disparate treatment of individuals. This burden is a heavy one; even in situations in which the costs
of equal treatment are high, society often concludes that the inherent fairness of a policy favoring nondiscrimination outweighs those
costs.
Society's preference for sexual equality is reflected in legislative
and judicial support for prohibitions on gender-based discrimination in such areas as employment, public accommodations, and education. It is now time to prohibit gender-based discrimination in
insurance. Although a national requirement of unisex insurance rating would entail certain costs, proponents of gender-based discrimination in insurance have not demonstrated that these costs are
significant enough to override the presumption that people should
not be subjected to discrimination on the basis of innate human

characteristics.

